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1

REPLY ARGUMENT
The trial court in this case, erred in granting Zions First
National Bank's ("Zions") Motion for Summary Judgment, by failing
to follow the two-step analysis required by Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c).

Rule 56(c) provides in the conjunctive that

summary judgment can be granted only if (1) "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact" and (2) "the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." The record amply demonstrates
that a reasonable jury could find that Gina Cook had a contract for
compensation with Zions, which included the privilege of receiving
accrued sick leave when requested, and that Zions breached that
contract by repeatedly denying those requests.

Therefore, because

the trial court incorrectly decided this case as a matter of law,
the summary judgment must be reversed under Rule 56(c) based on
facts in dispute.
I.

Although Mrs. Cook Repeatedly Asked Zions for One Day off to
Undergo a Diagnostic Procedure, She Was Not Required to and
Did Not Ask Zions to "Make Medical Decisions."
Zions argues that Mrs. Cook's contract claims fail as a matter

of law because she did not "present sufficient evidence in specific
factual form that is material to the question of whether she and
Zions entered into an express or implied employment contract that
.

. . requires Zions1 supervisors to foresee the 'need1 of a

medical appointment or procedure
l

."

(Appellee's Brief

("Zions1 Brief") at 19 and 20.)

Although Zions is correct that

there is no evidence in the record that Mrs. Cook asked it to make
medical decisions or to specifically foresee her actual medical
needs at the time her contract was breached, it is incorrect in
arguing that such evidence is an "essential element" of her prima
contract claim.1

facie

(Zions1 Brief at 19-20 and 22.)

Asking

Zions to make medical decisions was not part of Mrs. Cook's
contractual obligation any more than it was Zions1 duty (or right)
to make those decisions or to assess her need for a specific
diagnostic procedure.
It is undisputed that in early 1994, neither Mrs. Cook nor
Zions could have known of her actual medical condition, i.e., that
she had an aggressive malignant melanoma, (R. at 253; 310), nor
could they have specifically foreseen her medical needs. That does
not mean, however, that Zions bears no responsibility for its delay
in allowing Mrs. Cook one day off for a needed diagnostic procedure
which the facts show she repeatedly requested.

Thus, this case

should not have been decided as a matter of law, nor should it be

1

With respect to foreseeability, Zions confuses the elements
of a contract with the law of damages.
The foreseeable
consequences of a contractual breach are determined when the
contract is formed, not when the breach occurs. Berube v. Fashion
Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1050 (Utah 1989). See the discussion
regarding damages generally at 23-25 infra and more particularly as
set forth in the Brief of the Appellant ("Mrs. Cook's Opening
Brief") at 28-30.
2

reviewed under the correction of error standard suggested by Zions.
(Zions' Brief at 1-3.)

The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that

reviewing courts should "accord no deference to the trial court's
conclusion that the facts are not in dispute nor the court's legal
conclusions based on those facts."

Republic Groupf Inc. v. Won-

Door Corp, 883 P.2d 285, 288 (Utah App. 1994).

The factual

disputes, including Mrs. Cook's claim that Zions breached an
employment agreement by denying her the right to use sick leave
when she needed it, require that summary judgment be reversed.
II.

Zions1 Claim That it Had
Therefore Had No Obligation
Inconsistent with the Facts
and Construed Liberally in

No Contract with Mrs. Cook and
to Allow Her Leave When Needed Is
in the Record Which Must Be Viewed
Her Favor.

Zions has taken an absolute position that it has no employment
contract of any kind with Mrs. Cook.

Specifically, Richard

Crandall, Zions1 Vice-president and Director of Human Resources,
testified that Zions "does not enter into any individual employment
agreements with its employees and did not do so with respect to
Cook."

(Zions Brief at 6; R. at 95).

Zions' position, as stated

by Mr. Crandall, is typical of the position often taken by
employers

in order

to prevent

employees

from

presumption that their employment is at-will.

rebutting

the

In this case,

however, Zions seeks to go much further by claiming that it has no
contractual,

i.e., no legally

to its employees.

enforceable,

obligation of any kind

Zions' effort to avoid every enforceable
3

obligation, including Mrs. Cook's right to receive bargained-for
compensation, is both alarming and without precedent. The position
asserted by Zions and the precedent it seeks simply go too far.
As observed by the Utah Supreme Court and by this Court, an
employment relationship is a bundle of privileges which represent
the various rights and duties between an employer and employee.2
In forming and in maintaining that relationship, the parties agree
on which privileges each is to have.

However, in every true

employment relationship there is always present an agreement,
whether express, implied, or both, that the employee will receive
compensation and benefits for performing services.

Once those

services are rendered, the employer cannot avoid its duty to
provide the bargained for compensation and benefits by claiming
that it does not enter into any "employment agreements" with its
employees.3 (Zions1 Brief at 6, R. at 95.)
2

Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co. f 844 P. 2d 303, 307 (Utah
1992) ("At-will employment is a bundle of different privileges, any
or all of which an employer can surrender through an oral
agreement.") Accord DubQJg yt grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073, 1077
(Utah App. 1994) . Similarly, an employer may surrender privileges
by written agreement, by its representations, by a course of
conduct, or, as claimed by Mrs. Cook, by a combination of all
these. The fact that privileges have been surrendered "may arise
from a variety of sources, including the conduct of the parties,
announced personnel policies, practices of that particular trade or
industry, or other circumstances . . . ." Berubef 771 P.2d at 1044.
3

See also the discussion at 22-23 infra,
regarding Zions1
attempt to "disclaim" this fundamental part of Mrs. Cookfs contract
and the discussion at 30-33 in Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief.
4

A.

Mrs. Cook's Employment Agreement Gave Her The Express
Right to Involuntary Absences, i.e., Sick Leave.

In reply to Zions1 Brief, Mrs. Cook submits that, for purposes
of Zions' Motion for Summary Judgment, she established that she did
in fact have an employment contract —

at least to the extent that

she bargained for compensation, which included the privilege to
request and receive earned sick leave when needed.4
before

she became

In May 1988,

employed, Mrs. Cook was promised

by two

representatives of the bank that after an initial ninety-day
waiting period, she would automatically earn and be entitled to use
paid sick leave as part of her compensation.

(R. at 437.) Zions1

employment offer and Mrs. Cook's acceptance of that offer were
memorialized on July 28, 1988 in a written agreement signed by Mrs.
Cook and Joyce Misdom, one of those representatives.
and 441.)
Agreement"

(R. at 437-38

(See the "Employment Benefits Disclosure and Pay
(hereinafter

"Employment

Agreement") ,

Addendum "B" to Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief.)

attached

as

It is undisputed that

Zions employees earn sick leave as part of their compensation.

(R.

at 251-52; 332-33; 436; 439. ) 5
4

There has been no claim by Zions that Mrs. Cook had abused
or somehow forfeited her right and privilege to earn and receive
sick leave when she believed she needed it. As of January 1, 1994,
she had accrued 249.76 unused hours. (R. at 336.)
5
For additional facts evidencing Mrs. Cook's compensation
contract as it relates to sick leave in the context of the ongoing
relationship of the parties, see Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief at 4-9.
5

Zions notes that the Employment Agreement entered into by Mrs.
Cook and Ms. Misdom, the bank's Operations and Compliance Officer,
does not state that earned sick leave can be taken when needed.
(Zions1 Brief at 17.) That fact, however, does not mean that Mrs.
Cook had no right to request and receive sick leave when needed,
nor does it end the analysis.

First, Mrs. Cook's right

to

"involuntary absence" or sick leave is expressly stated in the
Employment Agreement which must be construed reasonably.6

"It is

well settled that '[c]ontracts are to be construed in light of the
reasonable expectations of the parties as evidenced by the purpose
and language of the contract.1"

HCA Health Serv. v. St. Mark's

Charitiesf 846 P. 2d 476, 481 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Nixon and
Nixonr Inc. v. John New & Assocs.f 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982)).
The concept of sick leave which must be taken only when convenient
for the employer, rather than when medically necessary, is not one
reasonably expected by any employer or employee.
Second, the promises made by Zions* representatives at the
time Mrs. Cook entered into employment confirmed her right to use
sick leave when needed.

(R. at 437.)

Zions clearly knew the

importance of sick leave as it related to Mrs. Cook's health when
6

The phrase "Involuntary Absence" as used in the Employment
Agreement, (R. at 441), is synonymous with the terms "sick leave",
"sick days" and "short term leave". See inter alia R. at 326; 33233; 335-37; 344-45; 351-53.
6

it offered her employment.

Ms. Misdom, who signed Mrs. Cook's

Employment Agreement, testified as follows:
Q.
So, the bank's sick day or short leave of absence
policy is designed, is it not, to be used by employees
who need to schedule medical treatment?
A.

Yes.
. . .

Q.
Okay. Is it your understanding that if an employee
is not allowed time off for medical care that the
employee['s] situation may become more serious?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Potentially life-threatening?
MS. BAAR: Objection. Same objection.

THE WITNESS: Potentially it could be.
(R. at 471-72.) Ms. Misdom also testified that it is Zions' policy
and practice to allow its employees time off for necessary medical
attention, diagnosis and treatment before health problems become
serious or life threatening. (R. at

471-72.)

Moreover, although

he claims that Zions enters into no employment agreements, Mr.
Crandall testified that Zions provides sick leave in order to be
"competitive" and to promote the health of its employees.

(R. at

325.) His statement reveals the importance of sick leave to Zions'
employees and prospective employees and the purpose of this
benefit.

The ability

and flexibility

is the essence of sick leave.

to take time off when needed

This bargained-for privilege was a

significant part of Mrs. Cook's compensation package and an
7

important inducement for her in accepting Zions1 offer.

(R. at

251-52; 305; 332-33; 437-39.)
Finally, Zions1 claim that it has no

obligation to allow

earned sick leave "when needed" is in stark contrast with Zions1
admission in its September 20, 1994 Newsbreak publication to its
employees

stating

that "Zions policies provide

adequate time to seek needed

medical treatment."7

15-16, 124; R. at 349.) (emphasis added).

employees

with

(Zions1 Brief at

(A copy of the Newsbreak

article is attached to Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief as Addendum "C".)
Zions1 claim that it provides "adequate time to seek needed medical
its employees should

treatment" means that
treatment when needed

—

be

allowed

medical

otherwise, why claim to provide adequate

time for needed treatment at all?

Any other interpretation of

Zions1 statement is as incongruous as Zions1 claim that it has no
contractual obligation to provide the compensation and benefits
promised to its employees for their services.
B.

Mrs. Cook's Express Employment Contract is Confirmed and
Further
Evidenced
by an
Implied-in-Fact
Contract
Regarding Her Privilege to Use Sick Leave.

Although Mrs. Cook used sick leave for years in reliance on
Zions1 promises to provide it, (R. at 251; 304-06; 308; 439), Zions
argues that as a matter of law, Mrs. Cook could not have had an
7

It is undisputed that the admission in the Newsbreak article
is an accurate statement of the bank's position, (R. at 348; 435),
and "depicts [Zions1 policy] very well." (R. at 411.)
8

implied contract which included the benefit of sick leave because
"Utah courts have never indicated an intention to extend the
implied-in-fact employment contract exception to the at-will rule."
(Zions' Brief at 18.)

Specifically, at page 28 in its Brief, Zions

quotes the following statement from Justice Zimmerman's concurring
opinion in Berube regarding the need for caution in creating
exceptions to the at-will doctrine:
Because the law in this area is in a state of flux, and
because the at-will doctrine has become well entrenched
in our law and any change in it has the potential to
affect the practices of almost every employer in Utah, we
must proceed with care in recognizing exceptions to that
doctrine.
Berubef 771 P.2d at 1050.

Zions1 reliance on Justice Zimmerman's
The issue here is not the

exceptions

to the at-will rule any more than it is the rule itself.

In short,

at-will caution is misplaced.

Zions1 position is that the only right in the bundle of privileges
which can result in an implied contract relates to whether an
employee is terminable at-will. The trial court erroneously agreed.
Even though Mrs. Cook's claims are not based on the at-will rule,
the trial court, misled by Zions' reliance on at-will cases,
incorrectly concluded that there was no contract, and ruled that
in this case, since there has been no discharge,
there
exists an even stronger reason to disallow an [sic] suit
for Breach of Contract. The Plaintiff remains employed
yet wishes to maintain her lawsuit for breach of contract
while going to work every day and continuing to receive
employee benefits and income.
9

(R. at 478.) (emphasis in original).

Instead of viewing all of the

facts in Mrs. Cook's favor,8 the trial court specifically noted
that

there

had

been

'ho discharge"

and

decided

Mrs. Cook's

contractual claims as a matter of law, thus committing reversible
error under Rule 56(c).
The California Supreme Court stated:
[c]onceptually, there is no rational reason why an
employer's policy that its employees will not be demoted
except for good cause, like a policy restricting
termination or providing for severance pay, cannot become
an implied term of an employment contract. In each of
these instances, an employer promises to confer a
significant benefit on the employee, and it is a question
of fact whether that promise was reasonably understood by
the employee to create a contractual obligation.
Scptt v, Pacific Gas and Elec. CQ^, 904 P.2d 834

(Ca. 1995)

(holding employment contract restricting employer's ability to
demote employee could be implied-in-fact).

The Scott opinion,

despite Zions' attempt to distinguish it, is consistent with the
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Berube.

The Scott court further

stated:
The principle that implied employment contract terms may
arise from the employer's official and unofficial
policies and practices is [long standing] and has not
been confined to the area of wrongful termination. As
8

This case is not improper because of its unique facts as
implied by the trial court. Rather, it has necessarily arisen
because of the increasing trend among employers to offer incentives
and bargained-for benefits while attempting, at the same time, to
retroactively as well as prospectively "disclaim" their obligations
to provide the same. See the disclaimer discussion at 22-23
infra.
10

the court stated in Chinn v. Ch-ina Nat. Aviation Corp.
(1955) 138 Ca. App. 2d 98 . . . s 'Of late years the
attitude of the courts (as well as of employers in
general) is to consider regulations of the type which
offer additional advantages to employees as being in
effect offers of a unilateral contract which offer is
accepted if the employee continues in the employment, and
not as being mere offers of gifts.1 [] In Hepp v.
ppckhead-California Co. (1978) 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, this
reasoning was extended to policies regarding nonmonetary
employment benefits.
Scott 904 P.2d at 839 (internal citations omitted).9

Nothing in

Berube nor its progeny requires that an implied contract provision
relate only to the termination of employment.

As noted in Berubef

"employment contracts should be construed to give effect to the
intent of the parties.

An implied-in-fact promise is a judicial

attempt to reach precisely that result." Beruber 111 P. 2d at 1044.
Similarly in Barber v. SMH(US)f Inc.f 509 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994), a case relied on by Zions, it was noted:
In
analyzing
oral
statements
for
contractual
implications, a court must determine the meaning that
reasonable person might have attached to the language.
In order to determine whether there was mutual assent to
a contract, the court applied an objective test, . . .
looking to the expressed words of the parties and their
visible acts. . . . " (citations omitted).

9

Prior to the denial of Mrs. Cook's requests for time off,
Zions had not unilaterally eliminated or significantly changed
either her employment contract or its policy and practice of
compensating employees with the privilege of earning and using sick
leave. (R. at 250-51; 304.) Therefore, the "continued performance
of [Mrs. Cook's] duties is adequate consideration for . . . [her]
implied contract provision." Berubef 771 P.2d at 1044.
11

Zions has cited no contrary authority holding that a term of the
employment relationship can become an implied-in-fact contract only
if it relates to termination issues.
Zions also incorrectly argues that if the Employment Agreement
created an express contract, "the provisions of that document alone
would govern Cook's rights/'

(Zions1 Brief at 25.)

As authority

for its position, Zions1 cites Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.f 618
P. 2d 497 (Utah 1980) and Barber, 509 N.W.2d at 791.

These cases

simply hold that an express contract term cannot be overridden by
an inconsistent implied-in-fact contract term regarding the same
subject matter, and are therefore inapposite to the issue at hand.
In this case, the Employment Agreement in no way contradicts any
implied contract relating to Mrs. Cook's right to earn and use sick
leave.

The typical employment relationship consists of express and

implied-in-fact agreements. As noted earlier, implied contractual
terms

may

arise

from

many

sources,

including

the parties'

representations, conduct, practices in the trade or industry or
other circumstances which "should be construed to give effect to
the intent of the parties." Berubef 771 P.2d at 1044.

The terms

are those expressed in the parties' language or implied from their
conduct.

Davies v. Olsonr 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah App. 1987).

Moreover, it should be noted that Zions' legal positions are
contrary to its factual claims.

For example, in addition to its
12

Newsbreak statement, Zions relies on the deposition testimony of
Ms. Misdom that "during a conversation with Cook about the lump on
her lip, she told Cook that 'if you need to go to the doctor, go to
the doctor"" and that if you do, Ms. Kenney "'would not fire you. ,M
(Zions1 Brief at 14-15 and Exhibit "A" therein.)

Regardless of

whether Ms. Kenney would have fired her, Zions now faults Mrs. Cook
for not just leaving.

(Zions1 Brief at 21-22 and 36-37.)

If Mrs.

Cook could have left work as Zions now claims, it must concede she
had that right. To the extent that right is not expressly found in
the Employment Agreement or Zions1 oral representations which
expressly granted

her sick leave, it must be an implied right based

on the Employment Agreement, Zions1 representations, the parties1
course of dealings, their acknowledged intentions regarding Mrs.
Cook's right to use her sick leave, and the understood purpose of
sick leave.

Therefore, the issue becomes a factual dispute as to

whether Mrs. Cook was prevented from exercising that right.
The facts, admissions and all reasonable inferences therefrom
demonstrate that implicit in Mrs. Cook's right to earn and accrue
sick leave was the right to use it when needed.

The trial court,

ignoring these facts, which it should have viewed in the light most
favorable to Mrs. Cook, improperly decided this case as a matter of
law.

The summary judgment must therefore be reversed because a

reasonable jury could find that one of the privileges expressly
13

and/or implicitly given to Mrs. Cook as part of her agreed upon
compensation was the contractual right to receive sick leave when
needed, and that Zions breached that agreement.
III. Zions1 Claim That it Reserved Discretion to Grant or Deny Sick
Leave Must Be Viewed in Light of Its Current Claim That Mrs.
Cook Should Have Scheduled The Surgery And Not Gone to Work.
In its Brief, Zions argues that although employees earn sick
leave automatically, it has no obligation to provide sick leave
when needed.

This position is based on Zions' claim that an

employee's ability to receive sick leave is within the bank's sole
"discretion."

Mr. Crandall testified that Zions' policies "give

management discretion to grant or deny employee requests for time
off from work."

(Zions' Brief at 13, 518; R. at 409-10.)

For

support, Zions also relies on its 1992 and 1994 employee handbooks
which state that "[i]f it is absolutely impossible to schedule an
appointment for personal matters (medical, dental, etc.) at any
other time than during working hours, permission
be obtained

first

from your supervisor."

for

absence

must

(Zions' Brief at 11 and

12, 113; R. at 111 and 146.) (emphasis added).
Although Mrs. Cook did not receive a copy of any employee
handbook until April 8, 1994,10 (R. at 251; 306), she knew that
absences which could be scheduled required Ms. Kenney's prior

1

For a discussion of the handbook and its "disclaimer", see
Section V, infra and Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief at 30-33.
14

approval,

(R. at 252; 309; 344-45; 471-72.)

Mrs. Cook did all

that she could by repeatedly asking for one day to undergo surgery
before taking any scheduled time off.11

( R. at 252-53; 309-10.)

Zions progressively delayed Mrs. Cook from taking one day off
through most of February, March, April, and May of 1994.

She was

not allowed to undergo the diagnostic procedure with Ms. Kenney's
approval until May 20, 1994.

(R. at 253.)

Zions1 assertion that Mrs. Cook has not established "essential
elements" of her contract because she did not just leave work,
(Zions1 Brief at 19-20, 22), is misplaced for several reasons.
First, leaving work against her manager's explicit instructions is

On January 29, 1994, Mrs. Cook requested and received
approval from Ms. Kenney for one hour off on February 1, 1994 to
have the lump on her lip removed. (R. at 252; 309; 338-39; 362.)
Mrs. Cook went to her doctor's appointment on February 1, 1994, but
was told that the procedure would take a full day and would need to
be done in a hospital. (R. at 252; 309). After returning to work,
Mrs. Cook approached Ms. Kenney again and personally requested one
day off for the in-hospital procedure. (R. at 252; 309.) That
request and several other requests during the first week of
February, 1994, and in the following months, were denied. It is
also important to note that in a January, 1994 staff meeting, Ms.
Kenney, (R. at 306; 330; 389) , stated that she did not want anyone
to take time off during the next several months because of an
increased workload in the department caused by the department's
conversion to a new computer system, and Zions' acquisition of
another bank.
(R. at 252; 309; 355.) Because of the demands
placed on her as a result of the conversion to the new computer
system and the bank acquisition, Mrs. Cook was required to work
extensive overtime in the first few months of 1994. (R. at 252;
309.) Although short periods of time off were eventually allowed,
(Zions' Brief at 13-14), Mrs. Cook's requests to schedule a full
day off were denied for months.
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not one of the elements of any express or implied contract, and
therefore cannot be expected of a reasonable employee.

Second, her

contract required advance approval for missing work for a scheduled
medical appointment.

Finally, the fact that she did not just leave

work may relate, at most, only to mitigation, a factual issue not
before this Court.12
Zions1 factual claim that Mrs. Cook could have scheduled and
received treatment without approval, (Zions1 Brief at 14-15, 2123), must be considered in the light most favorable to Mrs. Cook.
The facts must also be viewed in the context in which they actually
occurred and not just in the revisionary manner in which Zions
would now cast them in order to avoid responsibility.

Thus, this

Court should disregard Zions1 claim that Mrs. Cook was not required
to obtain approval before scheduling time off, because in fact she
was.

Viewed in this light, the facts show that a jury could find

that a contract exists, and that Ms. Kenney breached that contract
by denying one day off for a medical procedure when it needed to be
scheduled.

The trial court improperly considered the issue of
mitigation of damages even though it was not raised by Zions in its
Motion for Summary Judgment and presents a question of fact (See
the discussion
in Mrs. Cook's Opening
Brief
at
39-40.)
Notwithstanding this error, Zions has followed the trial court's
lead by arguing on appeal that Mrs. Cook failed to meet her "burden"
by not having the surgery without prior approval. (Zions' Brief at
19 and 20.)
16

Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, the fact that Ms.
Kenney denies that Mrs. Cook's requests were made, (R. at 341; 390;
433-34; 475; 546), and the fact that Mrs. Cook claims that her
requests were

denied,

(R. at

252; 309-10),

existence of disputed material facts.

demonstrate

the

Zions, however, argues for

the first time on appeal, that summary judgment should be affirmed
because Mrs. Cook's fear of being terminated for disobeying her
supervisor was "subjective."

(Zions' Brief at 36-37.)

In support

of its "subjective fear" argument, Zions has attached to its Brief,
as Exhibit "A", a page from Ms. Misdom's deposition.

Zions relies

on this testimony to establish that Ms. Misdom told Mrs. Cook that
she would not be fired by Ms. Kenney if she scheduled the surgery
without approval and then telephoned in sick.

(Zions' Brief at 14

and 15, and Exhibit "A" attached thereto.)

Because Zions has

attached this testimony to its Brief, this Court should also
consider the testimony of Mrs. Cook in which she emphatically
states why she feared for her job, and directly contradicts Ms.
Misdom's testimony that she was told that she would not be fired.
(Pages 107, 108 and 220 of Mrs. Cook's perpetuation deposition
taken by stipulation on January 15-17, 1996 are attached hereto as
Exhibit "A".)13
13

Mrs. Cook did not include testimony relating to Zions'
subjective fear argument as part of the record because it did not
become an issue until raised by the trial court and discussed at
17

As the result of Zions' conduct, in the early months of 1994,
Mrs. Cook's bargained-for privilege to request and receive sick
leave when needed came into conflict with her understanding that
her employment would be terminated if she took a full day off
without permission from Ms. Kenney who was repeatedly denying her
requests.

This placed Mrs. Cook in the dilemma of choosing between

her job and the diagnostic test which, for all she could have
known, would have shown that she was perfectly healthy.

Mrs.

Cook's fear that she would be terminated if she left work for the
scheduled procedure against Ms. Kenney's instructions was justified
and must be viewed in the light most favorable to her.
IV.

The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exists Within the
Parameters of All Contracts and Was Breached When Zions Denied
Mrs. Cook Her Right to Use Sick Leave When Requested.
Zions argues that because it has no employment agreement with

Mrs. Cook and therefore no obligation regarding sick leave, its
relationship with her is not subject to any implied covenant of
good faith or fair dealing.

(Zions' Brief at 46-47.)

On the other

hand, Zions also claims that it retained sole discretion to grant
or deny requests for scheduled medical treatment.
11-13; R. at 111 and 146.)

(Zions' Brief at

To the extent Zions properly retained

length at oral argument. (See inter
alia R. at 517-20, 533, 569
and 585-88.)
An appellate court, in its discretion, may decide
a case on any point that is proper for its disposition, even if
first raised in a reply brief. Romrell v. Zions First National
Bankr N.A.f 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980).
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sole discretion (a claim which is at times inconsistent with other
positions it has taken) ,14 Zions had a duty to exercise that
discretion in good faith.

In Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd.

v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, 889 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1994), this
Court stated that
parties who retain express power or discretion under a
contract can exercise that power or discretion in such a
way as to breach the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Our courts have determined that a party must
exercise express rights awarded under a contract
reasonably and in good faith. See Brehany v. Nordstrom,
Inc. 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991) [and] Resource
Management CQ. V. Weston Rapch and Livestock CQt, 706
P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 1985) (additional citations
omitted).
Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 450.
An employee's right to request sick leave and an employer's
discretion, if any, in granting or denying the request present
issues which may be difficult to fully address in contracts.

In

Olympus Hills, this Court noted such difficulties, observing that
"contracting parties, hard as they may try, cannot reduce every
understanding to a stated term . . . .
14

Instances inevitably arise

For example, for purposes of this appeal, Zions' discretion
in denying requests for sick leave, when viewed in the light most
favorable to Mrs. Cook, is limited (1) by its Newsbreak admission:
"Zions policies provide employees with adequate time to seek needed
medical treatment," (R. at 349); and (2) by its current claim that
Mrs. Cook could have left work for a full day without prior
approval. (Zions' Brief at 14-15; 21-23.) It should also be noted
that Zions' discretion was necessarily rooted in a contractual
relationship with Mrs. Cook, as demonstrated by the cases discussed
in this section.
19

in which one party exercises discretion retained in a way that
denies the other a reasonably expected benefit of the bargain."
Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 450 (citation omitted).
In such situations, both the employee and the employer must
act reasonably.

For example, if an employee abuses sick leave, the

employee may jeopardize that privilege.
improperly withholds requested

Similarly, if an employer

sick leave, it may breach an

employment contract, as in this case.

"The law of good faith and

fair dealing, though inexact, attempts a remedy for such abuse."
Olympus Hills 889 P.2d at 450.

"Good faith performance [or]

enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of
the other party."

Olympus Hillsr

889 P.2d

at 451

(quoting

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1979)).
It is well settled in Utah that "[w]here a contract confers on
one party a discretionary power affecting the rights and interests
of the other party, that discretionary power cannot be exercised
arbitrarily, unreasonably, unfairly or in bad faith."

Olympus

Hills 889 p.2d at 456. see also Resource Management, 706 p.2d at
1037.

Thus, the essence of a covenant of good faith and fair

dealing is objectively reasonable conduct. Olympus Hillsr 889 P.2d
at 458 (citing In re Vryonisf 248 Cal. Rptr. 807, 812 (Cal. 1988)).
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The trial court erroneously agreed with Zions' claim that this
covenant does not exist in Utah in the employment context.
Brief at 44-46; R. at 479-480.)
because

(Zions'

This conclusion is incorrect

"[i]t is fundamental that every contract includes a

covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to dealings
between the parties."15 Olympus Hills, 889 P. 2d at 450 n.l.
Moreover, "the obligation of good faith is 'constructive' rather
than 'implied' because the obligation is imposed by law and cannot
be disclaimed."

Olympus Hillsf 889 P.2d at 450 n.4, relying on

Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co.
1933).

r

188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y.

Accord Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.r 701 P.2d 795, 801 n.4

(Utah 1985) (holding duty to perform contract in good faith cannot,
by definition, be waived by either party to agreement).
Moreover, whether a party has breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is generally a factual issue, not an issue
subject to resolution as a matter of law. Western Farm Credit Bank
v. Prattf 860 P.2d 376, 380 (Utah App. 1993).

To claim that

employees have the right to accrue sick leave, but not the right to
use it when needed is contrary to common sense and the reasonably
15

This Court, in Dubois v, grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073 (Utah
App. 1994), has already rejected the argument "that there is not an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in either at-will
or other sorts of employment contracts." Dubois, 872 P.2d at 1078
(emphasis added). The "implied covenant protects an employee from
denial of rights under the contract . . . ." Dubois, 872 P.2d at
1078-79. See also Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief at 33-37.
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expected benefit of the bargain which Mrs. Cook negotiated with
Zions.

A jury question therefore exists as to whether Zions

breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
exercising discretion in a way that vitiated the agreed common
purpose of sick leave and Mrs. Cookfs justified expectations.
V.

Zions1 Attempted Disclaimer of the Obligation to Provide
Bargained-for Compensation Nullifies the Essence of Employment
Relationships and Must Be Rejected.
In its effort to create a broad and dangerous precedent, Zions

argues that even if it had a contract with Mrs. Cook which allowed
her to earn and use paid sick days as needed, that obligation was
disclaimed.

(Zions1 Brief at 38-44.)

Although the at-will nature

of employment allows employers to prospectively

change the terms of

the employment relationship, or to terminate it altogether, no
employer should be able to use a disclaimer to deny any form of
earned

compensation.

Thus,

Zions'

disclaimer

argument

fundamentally unfair because it would retroactively
aspect

of the

employment

relationship

which

is

void that

requires

agreed

compensation for services rendered.
The handbook which Mrs. Cook received on April 8, 1994,
confirms the compensation agreement and practice Mrs. Cook had
relied on for years.

(R. at 251-52; 304-06; 308; 439.)

Although

Ms. Kenney initiated a written form for use by employees in her
department when requesting leave, she testified that this system
22

merely allowed her to keep track of scheduled absences.
Brief at 13, fl9; R. at 415-16.)

(Zions1

Otherwise, Zions has never

changed the terms of Mrs. Cook's involuntary absence or sick leave
agreement.
employees

(R. at 250-51; 304.)
continue

to

earn

It is undisputed that Zions1

sick

leave

as

part

of

their

compensation, (R. at 325-26; 334-35; 344; 351-53), and that at the
beginning of 1994, Mrs. Cook had accrued nearly 250 unused hours.
(R. at 336-37.)
VI.

No disclaimer could nullify that.16

Zions1 Refusal to Allow Mrs. Cook to Take One Day off Work
When She Requested It Breached Her Employment Compensation
Contract, Resulting in Damages.
On appeal Zions continues to argue that, as a matter of law,

there was no contract, but also, for the first time, attempts to
move this Court away from that issue by arguing that even if there
were a contract, it was not breached because Zions eventually
provided Mrs. Cook her accrued sick leave.

In order to determine

the existence of a breach, it is crucial to understand what was
bargained for. Mrs. Cook entered into her employment with Zions in
part because of the flexibility offered by paid sick leave. What
was agreed upon by the parties was the right to receive sick leave
when needed.

When Zions prevented Mrs. Cook from taking one day

16

It should be noted that a review of the handbook disclaimer,
(R. at 106) , shows that what Zions is actually attempting to avoid
is an employee's ability to rebut the at-will presumption, not an
employee's right to receive compensation. See also the discussion
regarding Zions' disclaimer in Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief at 30-33.
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off work through most of February, March, April, and May of 1994 in
order to have the lump on her lip removed and biopsied, it breached
her compensation agreement.

As previously noted in Mrs. Cook's

Opening Brief at 27, a breach of contract is nonperformance of a
legal duty when due under a contract.
Contracts at §235(2) (1981).

Restatement (Second) of

Delaying an employee's right to

receive sick leave when needed is the same as to denying it
altogether.
Moreover, the sick leave agreement was sufficiently definite
and understood by the parties as evidenced by their many years of
contractual performance.

As long as the agreement is definite

enough to allow a fact finder to determine whether one party has
breached it and to award some kind of reasonable damages to the
wronged party, the contract is not void for indefiniteness.

Cook

Assoc, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P. 2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1983) (holding
"reasonable level of certainty required to establish the amount of
a loss is generally lower than that required to establish the fact
or cause of a loss.")

In this case, the contract for compensation

between the parties is definite enough for the trier of fact to
determine its terms, the existence of a breach, and an appropriate
remedy.17
17

See also the discussion in Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief at 233 0 regarding damages and what was within the foreseeable
contemplation of the parties.
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Construing all facts and all inferences in favor of Mrs. Cook,
there is ample evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the
parties entered into a binding agreement concerning compensation
which was breached, causing damages.

Consequently, Zions was not

entitled to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief and
this Reply Brief, Mrs. Cook respectfully submits that the judgment
granted in Zions1 favor must be overturned with this case remanded
for a determination of factual issues.
DATED this 15th day of March, 1996.
HOOLjB^& KING,

L.C.

Urn 11 M ^
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1

will.

2

why didn't you just leave work no matter what and go have

3

this thing checked to find out what it was?

4

just walk out even if it meant you were going to get fired?

5

But, Gina, back in February, March and April of 1994,

A.

Why didn't you

Well, I had been told that it was a clogged

6

mucous seal.

I was —

I hoped that's what it was, that's all

7

it was.

8

didn't get it signed and wasn't up on par with this request

9

for hours, I would be fired.

I had been told if I didn't take my paper in and

10

Q.

You were afraid of being fired?

11

A.

Yeah.

12

I didn't want to be fired.

I'd worked

hard to get where I was at.

13

Q.

Why were you so concerned about being fired?

14

A.

Because when this form was handed out to us, it

15

was very specifically told in a staff meeting that if it was

16

not filled out and signed by Pam and by Gaylene and we took a

17

day off or we left, we would be terminated.

18
19
20

Q.

Were you worried about —

why were you worried

about losing your job?
A.

Well, I still had a child at home.

21

was still living at home.

22

any money to take care of it.

23

daughter had had some problems with her little girl and she

24

was staying with me.

25

She'd had a baby.

My youngest

She didn't have

I was helping her.

My oldest

I was raising two grandchildren plus another
107

1

child.

I was the sole support of my family.

2

just don't go out and find a job every day.

3

something that just happens along the way.

4

of protect yourself, protect your job.

5

with everything I knew, the fact that all it was was a

6

clogged mucous seal.

7

Q.

8

for time off?

9

A.

I asked for time off, yes.

for time off.

11

being healthy.

12

want to be sick.

14

Q.

It's not just
You have to kind

And I kept hanging on

And you've indicated that you continued to ask

10

13

You know, you

I never quit asking

I'm the type of person that takes pride in
I want to be alive.

I want to live, I don't

You also indicated that you attempted to get a

note from your doctor?

15

A.

Yes, I did.

I didn't have an appointment and so

16

I had called the nurse, and she couldn't get me in so I had

17

—

18

said, "Karen, what did he say?"

19

not an emergency."

20

wish I could get somebody to listen to m e . "

21
22
23

I had gone down there.

Q.

And her name was Karen.

And I

And she said, "He said it's

I said, "I'm so scared, Karen, I just

Did you ever try to schedule the appointment on a

Saturday?
A.

Yeah, I tried that too and they don't do

24

surgeries on Saturdays unless it's an emergency, and he

25

didn't feel I was an emergency.
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1

surgery done to remove the lump from your lip; is that

2

correct?

3

A.

4

came up, yes.

5

Q.

And her title was compliance officer?

6

A.

I believe so.

Q.

And I think she testified that she was an officer

7

10

of the bank when she had her deposition taken.

Was that your

understanding as well?

11
12

As far as I know, that's what it

was.

8
9

I had a conversation with her and I do think that

A.

I can't remember.

It seems like something like

Q.

You testified that she said to you, "Make the

that.

13
14

appointment to have the surgery done and then phone in

15

sick."

16

me."

And then you said to her, "But Gaylene will fire
Is that correct?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And did she tell you after that, "Gaylene will

19

not fire you for doing that?"
A.

She couldn't tell me what Gaylene was going to

22

Q.

But did she say that?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Angie Mamales, do you remember her?

25

A.

I do.

20
21

do.
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